Does tax enforcement matter for the cost of bank loans? Evidence from the United States by Bermpei, Theodora & Kalyvas, Antonios Nikolaos
 Essex Finance Centre 
Working Paper Series 
 





“Does tax enforcement matter for the cost of bank loans? 
Evidence from the United States” 
 
 










Essex Business School, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ 




Does tax enforcement matter for the cost of bank loans? Evidence 













We examine the relationship between the tax enforcement effort of the internal revenue 
service (IRS) and the cost of bank loans in the US syndicated market. We measure tax 
enforcement by the rate of IRS audits and find that it decreases bank loan spreads. This 
finding holds in a series of robustness and sensitivity tests such as the use of alternative IRS 
tax enforcement measures, instrumental variable regressions, panel data estimations and a 
quasi-experimental framework of the Section 404b of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. We 
also find that the negative effect of IRS tax enforcement on loan spreads strengthens for 
smaller corporations. In addition, we show that stringent IRS tax enforcement decreases the 
probability that loan contracts will contain covenants. Overall, these findings suggest that 
banks acknowledge the informational and monitoring role of tax enforcement in the private 
debt market.  
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1. Introduction  
A stream of studies provides evidence that tax enforcement acts as a monitoring mechanism 
that plays an informational role for participants in the financial markets. These studies find 
that tax enforcement alleviates the asymmetry of information between firms and other 
financial participants and decreases the cost of equity (El Ghoul, Guedhami & Pittman, 
2011), the cost of bonds (Guedhami & Pittman, 2008) and the probability of a stock price 
crash (Bauer, Fang & Pittman, 2017). In this study, we contribute to this stream of the 
literature by examining the relationship between the tax enforcement effort of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) and the cost of syndicated loans in the United States. In particular, we 
attempt to provide an answer to the following question: Does IRS tax enforcement decreases 
the cost of syndicated bank loans for US corporations? 
The theoretical premise of the ability of tax enforcement to alleviate information asymmetries 
between firms and investors or creditors rests on its function as a mechanism of external 
corporate governance that limits the potential for managerial rent-seeking behaviour (Desai, 
Dyck & Zingales, 2007). Tax enforcement reduces the ability of firms’ managers to engage in 
risky tax positions that are a source of information asymmetries. To prevent detection from 
the tax agency, risky tax positions entail complexity and information obfuscation. The 
complex and opaque environment that stems from aggressive tax positions increases 
information asymmetry and facilitates managerial rent-seeking (Kim, Li & Zhang, 2011). 
Stringent tax enforcement discourages managers from taking risky tax positions and deters 
their rent-seeking behaviour (Desai, Dyck & Zingales, 2007; Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). 
This, in turn, improves the information available on the firm to outside investors or creditors 
(Desai, Dyck & Zingales, 2007; Hanlon, Hoopes and Shroff, 2014). The empirical findings 
that tax enforcement reduces the cost of equity (El Ghoul, Guedhami & Pittman, 2011) and 
the cost of bonds (Guedhami & Pittman, 2008) is consistent with this notion.   
On the other hand, government agencies such as the IRS have been ineffective in identifying 
financial and accounting fraud scandals (e.g., the Enron case). This casts some doubt on the 
ability of such agencies to play an informational role in the capital and debt markets 
(Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew, 2004; Dyck, Morse & Zingales, 2010). Furthermore, 
government agencies often lack appropriate resources and staffing levels that may diminish 
their monitoring ability (Jackson & Roe, 2009; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). For these 
reasons, Hanlon & Heitzman (2010) and Hanlon, Hoopes & Shroff (2014) call for more 
research about the extent to which tax enforcement could act as an external corporate 
governance mechanism that reduces information asymmetries issues. We follow their 
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suggestion and investigate the unexplored yet effect of IRS tax enforcement on the cost of 
bank loans in the US syndicated loan market.  
Focusing this study on the effect of IRS tax enforcement on the cost of bank loans is 
important for several reasons. The first is that debt is the most significant funding source for 
corporations in the US. Around 75% of new corporate financing in the US comes in the form 
of debt (Contessi, Li & Russ, 2013).  The majority of this new debt funding comes in the 
form of bank loans even for large public corporations (Barath, Dahiya, Saunders, & 
Srinivasan, 2008; Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 2014; Khang, King & Nguyen, 2016
3
). It is, 
therefore, essential from a managerial and public policy standpoint to investigate the effect of 
IRS tax enforcement on the cost of bank loans for US corporations.  
Secondly, bank loans provide a challenging area in which to investigate the ability of tax 
enforcement to act as an external form of corporate governance that alleviates information 
asymmetries in the debt markets. The empirical evidence of such ability so far comes from 
the bond market (Guedhami & Pittman, 2008). However, banks, in comparison with bond 
investors, are more efficient in solving informational asymmetry issues through screening and 
monitoring (De Fiore & Uhlig, 2011).  This is because banks enjoy comparative advantages 
and scale economies in information production and debt monitoring (Diamond 1984). Banks 
also have stronger incentives to invest in the acquisition of knowledge on borrowers due to 
their comparatively large stake in the funding of the latter (Boot & Thakor, 2009). Holders of 
corporate bonds are more fluid and dispersed. Thus, their incentive to engage in borrower 
monitoring is smaller in comparison with banks (Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, 1999). 
Additionally, banks have access to inside (private) information on the borrower firm that 
bond investors do not have (Fama, 1985; Dass and Massa, 2011). The above discussion 
renders bank loans a hard testing ground for the ability of tax enforcement to act as an 
external corporate governance mechanism that could decrease information asymmetry issues 
and thus the cost of corporate financing. In other words, it is interesting to investigate if 
banks, who themselves screen and monitor borrowers more closely than other types of debt-
holders, value the informational and monitoring role of tax enforcement. 
 
 
                                                          
3 As an example, the study of Khang, King & Nguyen (2016) shows that 56% of the total debt of a typical US 
corporation consists of bank loans. 
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Thirdly, the IRS has lately faced severe cuts regarding its financing and its resources. Marr & 
Murray (2016) report that the IRS has experienced a 17% cut in its federal funding over the 
2010-2016 period. This has forced the IRS to cut substantially its workforce, employee 
training, and the upgrade of its IT systems over the same period. For example, over the 2010-
2016 period, the IRS has experienced a 17% reduction of its enforcement staff (Marr & 
Murray, 2016). The new US administration plans to continue the defunding of the IRS as 
President Trump’s first budget blueprint calls for a further reduction of $239m in the budget 
of the IRS (The Hill, 2017). Recent empirical evidence from Nessa, Schwab, Stomberg & 
Towery (2016) shows that fewer IRS resources weaken the tax enforcement process. The 
authors find that cuts in the IRS budget and the number of IRS enforcement agents lead to a 
decrease in the rate of tax audits. By investigating the impact, if any, of IRS tax enforcement 
on the cost of banks loans in the US we add to the public policy discussion about the future of 
the IRS and its usefulness to the US economy.  
To investigate the effect of IRS tax enforcement on the cost of bank loans we use a sample of 
9,971 syndicated loan facilities initiated for US public firms over the 1992-2016 period.  We 
measure the cost of bank loans as the “all-in-spread” which is the interest payment in basis 
points above LIBOR plus the annual fee (in basis points) for each loan facility a firm attains 
(see, e.g., Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 2014; Delis, Hasan & Mylonidis, 2017). To capture IRS 
tax enforcement, we employ the yearly rate of face-to-face IRS corporate audits. These audit 
rates use information from the IRS records about the corporate tax returns received and audits 
completed by firm size class (there are eight classes based on the size of firms’ assets) each 
year. Thus, this measure of IRS tax enforcement exhibits variability according to firm size 
class and the calendar year. We obtain information on the rate of IRS audits from the 
Transactional Records Access Clearing House (TRAC). TRAC, which is based in Syracuse 
University, sources its data from the IRS system that the agency uses for its internal use and 
its communication of information to the public and the US Congress (Hanlon, Hoopes & 
Shroff, 2014). This measure of IRS tax enforcement has been widely used in the literature 
(Guedhami & Pittman, 2008; El Ghoul, Guedhami & Pittman, 2011; Hanlon, Hoopes & 
Shroff, 2014; Bauer, Fang & Pittman, 2017) to gauge the levels of tax enforcement in the US. 
Also, we use an array of alternative IRS tax enforcement proxies, which we also source from 
TRAC, to supplement the analysis. These measures include yearly data on IRS staffing 
levels, IRS criminal penalties as well as IRS civil and criminal litigations.  
After controlling for several firm and loan characteristics, our main finding is that IRS tax 
enforcement exerts a negative effect on the cost of bank loans. We find that an increase of the 
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IRS audit probability from 24.7% (25
th
 percentile) to 37.3% (75
th
 percentile) results in an 
approximately 10 basis points reduction in bank loan spreads. Taking into account the 
average loan size ($433 million) and loan maturity (4 years) in our sample, this reduction in 
bank loan spreads translates into $1.8m of interest savings on average. This finding provides 
empirical support to the view that tax enforcement could act as an external mechanism of 
corporate governance that reduces information asymmetry issues between firms and outsiders 
(in our case banks).  Our analysis also shows that the negative effect of IRS tax enforcement 
on the cost of banks loans strengthens for comparatively smaller corporations (firms with 
assets less than $250m). Small companies have a weaker information environment and 
weaker corporate governance and internal control mechanisms in comparison with larger 
firms (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Doyle, Ge & McVay, 2007; Boone & White, 2015). 
Therefore, the role of IRS tax enforcement in alleviating information asymmetries between 
firms and banks could be more critical for smaller corporations. Besides the cost of bank 
loans, we also provide evidence that tax enforcement affects the non-price terms of loans. In 
particular, we find that stringent IRS tax enforcement reduces the likelihood of the presence 
of covenants in bank loan contracts.  
The main finding of this study that stringent IRS tax enforcement reduces the cost of bank 
loans holds in a number of alternative specifications and tests. These include the use of 
alternative firm size measures
4
, alternative IRS tax enforcement variables, a cross-sectional 
identification strategy based on relationship lending, instrumental variable estimations that 
address potential endogeneity issues and fixed and random effects panel estimations that 
address unobserved firm heterogeneity. In addition, we take advantage of the recent findings 
of Bozanic, Hoopes, Thornock & Williams (2017) that the introduction of legislation that 
improves public corporate disclosure facilitates IRS tax enforcement and provide some 
evidence from a quasi-experimental setting. We investigate if banks reduce loan spreads after 
the introduction of the Section 404b of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. This section of the SOX 
act, which was enacted in 2002, requires firms to obtain an independent auditor attestation on 
the management evaluation of the efficacy of the company’s internal controls over financial 
reporting. By using a difference-in-difference analysis, we find that after the application of 
the Section 404b of the SOX Act firms that must comply with this regulation (accelerated 
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 Audit rates are based on IRS records on the corporate tax returns received and audits completed by firm size 
class in terms of asset each year. This allows the IRS audit rate measure to vary with firm size class and the 
calendar year. Thus, we assess whether asset level is spuriously responsible for the relationship between tax 




filler firms) report a significant decrease in their loan spreads when compared with exempted 
match firms (non-accelerated filler firms). This result conforms to the notion that banks 
reduce the cost of loans after the introduction of legislation that facilitates IRS tax 
enforcement. 
Altogether, our study shows that IRS tax enforcement has an important relationship with the 
cost of bank loans, which translates into lower borrowing costs. This study contributes to the 
literature in two ways. The first is that we add to the extant research that examines the 
external corporate governance role of tax enforcement (Hoopes, Mescall & Pittman, 2012; 
Hanlon, Hoopes & Shroff, 2014; Kubick, Lockhart, Mills & Robinson, 2017). In particular, 
we add to the stream of this literature that investigates the role of tax enforcement as an 
external mechanism of corporate governance that reduces information asymmetries and thus 
the financing costs for firms in the bond and equity markets in the US environment 
(Guedhami & Pittman, 2008; El Ghoul, Guedhami & Pittman, 2011; Bauer, Fang & Pittman, 
2017). We complement these studies by finding that IRS tax enforcement reduces the cost of 
bank loans. This finding is significant in the context of this literature because it shows that 
even banks, who are more efficient than other debt-holders in solving informational 
asymmetry problems through screening and monitoring, value the informational and 
monitoring role of the IRS. The second contribution is that we add to the burgeoning 
literature that investigates the determinants of the cost of loans. Several studies find that 
internal corporate governance mechanisms matter for the price of bank loans (see, e.g., 
Fields, Fraser & Subrahmanyam, 2012; Francis, Hasan, Koetter & Wu, 2012; Francis, Hasan 
& Wu 2013). This study provides evidence that external corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as tax enforcement, are also of importance when banks set the price of the loans they 
supply to corporations.  Furthermore, we also add to the limited literature that examines the 
effect of tax-related issues on the cost of bank loans (see, e.g., Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 
2014). Finally, this study could further stimulate the public policy debate about the 
importance of the IRS for the US economy. Our findings show that the IRS exerts a positive 
spillover to the US economy by reducing the cost of bank financing for US corporations.  
The rest of the paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 discusses some theoretical 
considerations and formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data, research design 
and descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the main empirical findings together with some 






2. Theoretical considerations and development of hypotheses 
In this section, we motivate our research hypotheses by focusing on the role of the tax 
enforcement as an external mechanism of monitoring and corporate governance that could 
alleviate asymmetry of information issues between banks and borrowers in the market for 
syndicated loans.  In brief, we use theory and previous empirical evidence to build on the 
notion that firms’ borrowing costs (loan spreads) are lower under more stringent tax 
enforcement. We also foresee that the negative relationship between IRS tax enforcement and 
the cost of bank loan strengthens for smaller corporations. 
Information asymmetry between banks and borrowers is an important factor for the pricing 
and the contract terms of loans. Banks demand a higher interest and set stringent contract 
terms, such as covenants, for the loans they supply to firms with poorer information quality 
(Graham, Li & Qiu, 2008; Hollander & Verriest 2016; Houston, Itzkowitz & Naranjo, 2017; 
Prilmeier, 2017). A source of the asymmetry of information between the insiders of a firm 
and outsiders is the rent-seeking behaviour of the former. A firm’s insiders, such as managers 
and controlling shareholders, may use the company’s resources for their benefit. Therefore, 
they have incentives to distort the information on firm performance, such as earnings, to 
conceal their rent-seeking activities from the firm’s outsiders (Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 
2003).   
The engagement of a firm in aggressive tax strategies and precarious tax positions could be 
complementary with the ability of managers to distort the information that outsiders have on 
the firm because it facilitates their rent-seeking behaviour. Desai & Dharmapala (2006) posit 
that engaging into aggressive tax strategies requires complex structures and an opaque 
information environment that would enable to conceal the tax aggressiveness intention and to 
reduce the possibility of detection from the tax enforcement agency. Therefore, tax 
aggressive strategies and risky tax positions provide firm managers with the justification and 
the tools to distort the information environment of the firm (Kim, Li & Zhang, 2011).  
These tools comprise inter alia earnings manipulations, related party transactions and the 
hoarding of information (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Kim, Li & Zhang, 2011). Consistent 
with this argument, Wilson (2009) finds that tax shelter participant firms employ aggressive 
financial reporting practices. Taking the above into consideration, risky tax positions could 
facilitate managerial rent-seeking behaviour and thus result in higher information asymmetry 
issues between borrowing firms and lenders. Furthermore, if the engagement of a firm into 
risky tax positions facilitates managerial rent-seeking, then it could also decrease firm value 
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(Desai, Dyck, & Zingales, 2007; Desai & Dharmapala, 2009)
5
. This, in turn, could hamper 
the ability of a firm to repay loans. Such information uncertainty and the need for intense 
monitoring may induce banks to charge a higher loan price to firms with aggressive tax 
strategies (Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 2014). 
Tax enforcement could act as an external corporate governance mechanism that reduces the 
asymmetry of information issues that stem from aggressive tax strategies and risky tax 
positions. Desai, Dyck & Zingales (2007), in their theoretical model, posit that outside 
stakeholders and the tax agency have the same interests in monitoring firm insiders. This, in 
turn, implies the presence of an informal settlement between firm outsiders and the tax 
agency. Intense monitoring from the tax agency could discourage firms from engaging in tax 
aggressive strategies and taking risky tax positions (Hoopes, Mescall & Pittman, 2012). 
Therefore, stringent tax enforcement could reduce the opportunity for managerial diversion of 
the firms’ resources because risky tax positions empower the tools that managers could use to 
engage into rent-seeking activities (Kim, Li & Zhang, 2011). In support of this argument, 
Dyck & Zingales (2004) stress that since the government and its public agencies (tax 
authority) have a direct economic benefit in firms’ tax returns, stringent tax enforcement may 
limit the opportunistic behaviour of insiders. Desai & Dharmapala (2007, 2009) also suggest 
that strict tax enforcement discourages firm insiders from misusing corporate income. This 
chilling effect of tax enforcement on the ability of managers to engage in rent-seeking actions 
could improve the information available on a firm since the managers’ justification for 
obfuscation of information subsides. Therefore, the quality of information available to a 
firm’s outsiders, such as the creditors, could improve when tax enforcement is strict (Desai, 
Dyck & Zingales, 2007; Hanlon, Hoopes & Shroff 2014). Moreover, if tax enforcement 
exerts a chilling effect on the diversion instincts of the managers then the value of the firm, 
and therefore its ability to repay the lenders, could improve. The disciplinary impact that 
stringent tax enforcement could exert on firm managers stems from the ability of the tax 
authority to impose substantial direct material penalties on firms (Wilson, 2009)
6
. It also 
stems from the indirect reputational and political costs that firms could incur due to 
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 To be clearer, aggressive tax practices and risky tax positions could have a negative or a positive effect on firm 
value. This depends on whether savings from tax liabilities are put to more productive use or are diverted to firm 
managers in the form of rent extraction (Goh, Lee, Lim & Shevlin, 2016). In case the second effect prevails, 
then risky tax positions could reduce firm value as Desai, Dyck & Zingales (2007) posit. 
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 For example, in 2007 the company Merck agreed to pay to $2.3 billion in interest, back taxes, and penalties in 
order to settle a tax dispute with the IRS. Other famous tax disputes that resulted in firms paying huge fines to 




aggressive tax behaviour (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Mills, Robinson and Sansing, 2010; 
Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2016).  The above discussion suggests that banks could value the 
informational and monitoring role of tax enforcement and reduce bank loan spreads.  
In the US context, the empirical evidence with regards to the capacity of the tax enforcement 
effort of the IRS to alleviate information asymmetries issues in the financial markets is 
inconclusive. The studies of Gedhami & Pittman (2008) and of El Ghoul, Guedhami & 
Pittman (2011) provide evidence that stringent IRS tax enforcement has a negative 
association with the cost of bonds and the cost of equity respectively. These findings provide 
empirical support to the view that the IRS plays an informational and monitoring role in the 
financial markets of the United States. However, the other side of the coin suggests that firm 
outsiders such as creditors and financial markets participants may find it difficult to accept 
the notion that tax enforcement agencies could reduce information asymmetry issues. The 
above stems from the fact that the IRS has failed to detect serious accounting and financial 
scandals (Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew, 2004; Dyck, Morse & Zingales, 2010). Furthermore, 
public enforcement agencies, such as the IRS, may possess limited firm-specific knowledge 
and lack of auditing resources/expertise that casts doubt on their monitoring capabilities 
(Jackson & Roe, 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Moreover, the policymakers who are in 
charge of public enforcement agencies, such as the IRS, may be reluctant to impose serious 
penalties, both financial and reputational, that aim to discourage tax aggressive strategies and 
risky tax positions. Accounting firms also perceive valuable any information that could 
obtain by employing former IRS commissioners
7
 and government tax experts in helping firms 
to avoid the possibility that the IRS will later challenge their tax returns (Larsen, Beran, 
D’Avino and Hawkins, 2007; Jiang, Robinson and Wang 2016).  
The previous mixed evidence with the regards to the ability of the IRS to alleviate 
information asymmetries issues motivates us to investigate if firms subject to stricter tax 
enforcement, i.e., higher IRS audit rates, enjoy lower borrowing costs in the US syndicated 
loan market. We conjecture that the IRS plays an important informational and monitoring 
role in the private debt market that could reduce bank loan spreads. Thus, we formulate our 
main hypothesis (H1) as follows: 
H1. US firms’ bank loan spreads, ceteris paribus, decrease when the IRS audit probability 
is higher. 
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 For instance, Kevin Brown was a former IRS commissioner who joined PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2008 as a 
principal and co-leader of PwC’s Tax Controversy and Regulatory Services practice. 
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We also develop a secondary hypothesis and posit that the negative association of IRS tax 
enforcement on bank loan spreads strengthens for smaller corporations. The theoretical model 
of Diamond (1985) postulates that large firms have stronger incentives for information 
production. This is because they enjoy a higher marginal benefit of disclosure in comparison 
with smaller firms. Several studies show that smaller firms have poor information 
environments and exhibit high information asymmetry issues (e.g., Bhattacharya, Desai & 
Venkataraman, 2013; Muslu, Radhakrishnan & Subramanyam, 2014; Lambert & Verrechia, 
2015). Recent empirical evidence from the US suggests that when banks face information 
problems with a specific corporate borrower, e.g., when they decide to price a loan for a 
smaller firm, they complement the information of the firm’s financial statements with the 
firm’s tax returns (Minnis & Sutherland, 2017). We conjecture that banks would perceive that 
the credibility of the information available on the tax returns is higher when the probability of 
an audit by the IRS is higher. 
Furthermore, several studies point out that smaller firms, because of limited resources,  suffer 
from weak internal corporate governance structures and controls with regards to their 
financial reporting (Ge & McVay, 2005;  Doyle, Ge & McVay, 2007;  Ge, Koester & McVay 
2017). This may aggravate managerial rent-seeking and lead to a further deterioration of the 
quality of the information available on small firms. This could be the case because, as 
discussed previously, the distortion of the actual financial position of the firm is a way 
through which managers would try to conceal their rent-seeking behaviour (Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki, 2003). Thus, more intensive IRS tax enforcement could be particularly important 
for the integrity of the information that smaller corporations produce.  
Finally, the IRS has shown over the years a shift in auditing smaller corporations. The 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) states in 2008
8
 that the IRS orders its 
revenue agents to focus on smaller firms, who are easier to audit, to increase the efficiency of 
its operations. Scholz and Wood (1998) in their theoretical model explain the notion of the 
IRS allocating resources based on some criteria, one of which is efficiency. The authors 
suggest that the IRS would prefer to shift resources towards a group of firms that for a given 
enforcement expenditure the IRS will earn easier returns just because it can detect with fewer 
effort cases of non-compliance. Smaller firms are more straightforward to audit due to a 
smaller scale and less complex operations.  
                                                          
8
 http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/newfindings/v13/  
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Based on the above discussion, stringent IRS tax enforcement could be particularly important 
for alleviating information asymmetry issues between banks and smaller firms. Therefore, 
our second hypothesis (H2) is the following: 
H2. US firms’ bank loan spreads, ceteris paribus, decrease more for smaller corporations 
when the IRS audit probability is higher. 
 
 
3. Data, Research Design and Descriptive Statistics 
3. 1 Sample Selection 
We source data on syndicated loans from Thomson One Banker. This database covers 
extensively the US syndicated loan market since 1985. It includes comprehensive information 
on the characteristics of each loan facility (borrowing loan spread, amount, maturity, 
covenants, etc.) and identifies the firm that receives each loan. This allows matching the 
firms’ identities from Thomson One Banker to Compustat to obtain firms’ accounting and 
financial information. A firm could obtain several loans in a given year. Therefore, we treat 
each loan facility as an individual observation
9
. We also eliminate from the sample all 
financial services firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) because they are subject to heavy regulation 
and their terms of borrowing may differ significantly from the rest of the firms in the sample. 
This matching process yields 15,858 loan facilities for 2,448 unique firms over the 1985-
2016 period. The IRS tax enforcement data are available for the 1992-2016 period. Therefore, 
when we merge the data on loan facilities and firm characteristics with the IRS tax 
enforcement data we obtain our final sample that comprises up to 9,971 observations at the 
firm-year level for the 1992-2016 period. Table 1 provides the definitions and the calculation 
details of the variables that we use in the analysis.  
Table 1 
 
3. 2 Measures of IRS Tax Enforcement 
The primary IRS tax enforcement measure we employ in this study relies on data that we 
obtain from the Transactional Records Access Clearing House (TRAC). TRAC is a non-
profit research institute associated with Syracuse University that collects data from the IRS.  
We source TRAC data on yearly face-to-face corporate audit rates by the IRS to use them as 
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 We follow previous studies and perform our estimations at the loan facility level and not at the loan package 
deal level (e.g. Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 2014; 2017).  Each loan package could contain more than one loan 
facility. Two loan facilities, even in the case they are part of the same loan package deal, could have different 
characteristics such as size, maturity and loan type.  Therefore, ignoring the differences between loan facilities, 
even when they are part of the same loan package deal, could introduce estimation bias. 
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the primary measure of tax enforcement.  These audit rates make use of information from the 
IRS about the corporate tax returns received and audits completed by eight firm size classes, 
regarding total assets, each year
10
.  Thus, the IRS audit rates exhibit variability both regarding 
firm size class and regarding the calendar year. In particular, the variable Audit rate stands 
for the number of completed IRS audits of corporate tax returns in a given year t for each IRS 
firm size class, divided by the number of corporate tax returns filed in the prior year (t-1) for 
the same firm size class. Therefore, the IRS audit rate captures the probability that a firm in 
each asset size group will experience an IRS audit in a given year. In our analysis, we include 
contemporaneous IRS audit rates on the assumption that managers predict future IRS audit 
rates on rational expectations and they do not make systematic errors.
11
 We focus on the IRS 
Audit rate as a tax enforcement measure because we are interested in capturing the managers’ 
view that a firm will experience an IRS audit in a given year. Thus, if the IRS Audit rate 
relates to the managers’ perception of the possibility that a corporation will experience an 
audit by the IRS, our analysis should be able to observe the relationship between IRS tax 
enforcement and the cost of bank loans
12
.  
By covering the most prolonged period (1992-2016) for which corporate IRS audit rates are 
available, we aim to enhance our inferences given the increased variability of audit rates 
during this timeframe.  Reinforcing the reliability of this tax enforcement measure, the IRS 
Oversight annual reports submitted to the US Congress regularly refer to TRAC’s corporate 
audit rate statistics. Furthermore, the IRS audit rates apply only to the US. This eliminates 
issues stemming from institutional differences that plague cross-country tax enforcement data 
(Hanlon, Hoopes & Shroff, 2014).  The credibility of the IRS audit rates as a measure of tax 
enforcement is evident in its extensive use by the government and several previous academic 
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 There are eight firm size classes based on the level of firms’ assets. These are the following: Asset size of 
more than $250 million, $100 to $250 million, $50 to $100 million, $10 to $50 million, $5 to $10 million, $1 to 
$5 million, $0.25 to $1 million and $0 to $0.25 million. Note that our sample includes observations from the 
seven biggest categories. This is because we did not find any firm in the smallest size class of $0 to $0.25 
million that has obtained a syndicated loan in the period under study. 
11
In robustness analysis, we have included lagged IRS audit rates as the actual IRS audit rates become available 
to the public with a delay. The reason being that there is a delay between the time that a firm reports its tax 
returns to the IRS and the time that the IRS completes its investigations (Graham & Tucker, 2006). 
12
 Hanlon, Hoopes & Shroff (2014) posit that managers obtain information from several sources (channels) in 
order to develop rational expectations about the level of tax enforcement (i.e. the probability of an IRS audit).  
Briefly, these include the following: information on proposed IRS budgets that are on public record, news about 
leadership changes in the IRS, recruiting prior IRS employees, formal or informal meetings with IRS officials, 
IRS statements that imply more stringent tax enforcement, trends in government revenue, historical audit rates 
released directly from the IRS and agencies (e.g. TRAC) that monitor and publish data on IRS activities. 
Furthermore, Hoopes, Mescall & Pittman (2012) provide evidence from interviews with managers that the 




studies (Guedhami & Pittman, 2008; El Ghoul, Guedhami & Pittman, 2011; Hoopes, Mescall 
& Pittman, 2012; Hanlon, Hoopes & Shroff, 2014).  
Yet, we complement our main tax enforcement variable with a number of federal-level 
proxies that capture IRS staffing levels. Reason being that the IRS admits that its tax 
enforcement capacity diminishes at lower staffing levels (Weisman, 2004; Rapperort, 2017). 
We source yearly data on the number of IRS employees, IRS revenue agents, and IRS 
criminal investigators. Furthermore, some studies acknowledge the governance role of civil 
and criminal litigations (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes & Shleifer, 2006) and the reputational 
damage of financial penalties on firms (Armour, Mayer & Polo, 2017). Therefore, we 
supplement our analysis with four additional IRS tax enforcement proxies. We use the 
number of IRS criminal referrals, IRS criminal prosecutions and IRS civil penalties for tax 
fraud and negligence against corporations. Following previous studies that employ these 
alternative IRS tax enforcement measures (see for example Guedhami & Pittman, 2008) we 
normalise them by the number of yearly corporate tax returns, apart from the IRS criminal tax 
prosecutions measure that we normalise it by the number of annual criminal referrals. 
Information on these alternative IRS tax enforcement variables is available for the 1992-2003 
period. This reduces our sample to 3,312 observations. Nevertheless, we conjecture that 
additional estimations with these alternative measures enhance the analysis.  
 
3. 3 Baseline Regression Model 
We test the prediction that stringent tax enforcement (higher IRS audit rates) decreases the 
cost of bank loans using the following equation: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑡 =
𝑓(𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡, 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠)
,               
 
Where 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the “all-in-spread drawn” (AISD), 
which is the loan interest payment in basis points over the LIBOR plus the annual fee for 
each loan facility that a firm attains in year t. 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 is the probability that a firm in a 
given firm size class will experience a face-to-face IRS audit in year t. We also employ 
control variables for several firm characteristics. These comprise measures of profitability, 
leverage, size, liquidity, tangibility, and the cash effective tax rate following previous 
empirical research (Graham, Li & Qiu, 2008; Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 2014; 2017).
 
 For 
these firm-level controls we use information from the year before the initiation of each loan 
facility to somewhat ease potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we control for loan 
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characteristics.  In particular, we employ control variables that capture the size of a loan and 
its maturity as well as dummies that control for the type and the purpose of a loan. We also 
use dummies to control for time (i.e. year) and industry effects following the 2-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC).   
 
3. 4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
In Panel A of Table 2, we present the IRS audit rates by size class and year as obtained from 
the TRAC database. We observe that there is considerable variation both across time and 
across the different firm size classes in the same calendar year. For example, the IRS audit 
rate for firms that fall within the largest size class (i.e., firms with an asset size larger than 
$250 million) in 2005 is 42.5%, while in 2016 it plummets to a record low of 17.8%. Panel B 
shows the number of firm-year observations in each of the IRS firm size class/year group. It 
is clear that the majority of our sample (84.2%) comprises large firms with assets beyond 
$250 million as in previous research (Guedhami & Pittman, 2008; Hoopes, Mescall & 
Pittman, 2012). Furthermore, our sample exhibits an even distribution over time, as each year 
contributes no more than 8.3% of the total number of observations.  
Table 2 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the primary explanatory variables that we include in 
the empirical specifications. Regarding loan characteristics, the average loan size and loan 
spread are $433 million and 200 basis points respectively. Furthermore, the mean loan 
maturity is around 4 years. These descriptive statistics are in line with previous empirical 
studies (see, e.g. Graham, Li & Qiu, 2008; Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 2014). In Table 4 we 
report the Pearson correlations coefficients for the main variables in our analysis. The 
preliminary evidence from the correlation analysis suggests that Audit rate and Loan spread 
exhibit a negative and signficant at the 1% level relationship. This negative association is 
consistent with our prediction in hypothesis H1. Altogether, we observe that Audit rate and 
the rest of the explanatory variables exhibit a low correlation. This attenuates collinearity 
concerns that could influence our estimations. Finally, the control variables correlate 
significantly with the spreads of bank loans and these associations are in line with those 
available in previous empirical work (Graham, Li & Qiu, 2008; Bharath, Dahiya & Saunders, 
2009; Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 2014).  





4. The Relationship between IRS Tax Enforcement and the Cost of Bank Loans 
 
4.1 Baseline Regressions 
 
Table 5 reports the baseline estimations with regards to our main hypothesis H1 that US firms 
enjoy lower bank loan costs when tax enforcement is more stringent. We use ordinary least 
square (OLS) models with robust standard errors and within-firm clustering.
13
 Our models 
show a good fit with 50% adjusted R
2 
on average. In the first model  of Table 5, we control 
for corporate characteristics while in the second model of Table 5 we control for both 
corporate and loan characteristics. The coefficients on Audit rate t  are significant at the 1% 
level and negative (-0.00709, -0.00796) in the first and second model of Table 5 respectively. 
We report similar findings when we use the extrapolation method to obtain IRS audit rate 
values for the 1985-1991 period (model 3 of Table 5) as the IRS audit rate data commenced 
in 1992. Analogous results we observe when we replace Audit rate t with its one-year lag 
Audit rate t-1 in a successive regression (model 4 of Table 5).   
Table 5 
Overall, these findings provide empirical evidence in support of our main H1 hypothesis that 
the spreads of bank loans decrease at higher tax enforcement levels. The estimations of the 
second model of Table 5 imply that increasing the probability of an audit by the IRS from 
24.7% (25th percentile) to 37.3% (75th percentile) leads to a 10 basis points decrease of bank 
loan spreads. An alternative way to evaluate the relevance of these findings is by looking at 
the mean borrowing firm savings, in terms of annual interest, based on the average loan size, 
which is $433 million, and the mean time to maturity that is around 4 years. As per our 
estimates, a shift of the IRS Audit rate t   from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile gives 
around $1.8 million in savings (1.74=433*0.00100296*4). Our findings are comparable with 
other studies that stress the importance of the asymmetry of information between borrowing 
firms and banks for the price of bank loans (Bharath, Dahiya & Saunders 2009; Francis, 
Hasan, Huang & Sharma 2012). Additionally, our results for the firm control variables show 
that larger firms, with higher profitability, less leverage and more assets that are tangible 
enjoy lower borrowing costs in line with previous studies (Graham, Li & Qiu, 2008; Bharath, 
Dahiya & Saunders 2009; Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 2014). Furthermore, large loans with 
shorter time to maturity enjoy lower bank loan spreads. These results conform to the ones of 
Chava, Livdan & Purnanandam (2008) who suggest that banks exposed at the risk of a long 
period to maturity charge higher loan spreads as a compensation.  
                                                          
13
 We aim to avoid spurious correlation for firms that may obtain more than one loan facility in the same year.    
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Overall, the estimations we obtain from the baseline models in Table 5 show that IRS audit 
rates and bank loan costs are negatively related. These findings, in line with our main 
hypothesis H1, suggest that banks perceive IRS tax enforcement as an efficient external 
corporate governance mechanism that could exert a chilling effect on the rent-seeking 
instincts of firm managers and reduce information asymmetries issues. Thus, banks charge 
lower prices for the loans they provide to firms when tax enforcement is more stringent. This 
finding provides evidence from the bank loan market that IRS tax enforcement plays a key 
monitoring role that reduces the cost of financing for US firms. Therefore, it complements the 
studies that provide such evidence from the US bond and equity markets (Guedhami & 
Pittman, 2008; El Ghoul, Guedhami & Pittman, 2011). 
In Table 6, we provide estimations from models that focus on smaller corporations. This 
means that we exclude from these estimates observations from firms that fall within the 
largest IRS defined firm size group (i.e. corporations with asset size higher than $250 
million).  This exercise aims to investigate if the negative relationship between the IRS audit 
rates and bank loan spreads persists and whether it is indeed stronger for smaller corporations 
as we conjecture in our secondary H2 hypothesis
14
.  We provide estimations for models that 
focus on firms that fall within the IRS firm size groups, regarding assets, of $250-$100 
million (models 1 and 2 of Table 6) and $100-0.25 million (models 3 and 4 of Table 6).
 
 The 
findings from the models that control for both firm and loan characteristics (model 2 and 
model 4 of Table 6) show that for firms in the $250-100 and $100-0,25 million asset size 
groups the coefficients of the Audit rate t  variable are negative (--0.0385, -0.228) and 
significant at the 1% level respectively. Comparing the findings of Table 6 with the ones in 
Table 5, which include the larger firms, we observe that the negative relationship between the 
IRS audit rates and the cost of bank loans is stronger, from an economic standpoint, for 
smaller corporations. Thus, the results from the estimations in Table 6 provide empirical 
support to our secondary H2 hypothesis that stringent IRS tax enforcement is particularly 
important for the reduction of the bank loan spreads for smaller corporations. These results 
suggest that IRS tax enforcement becomes vitally important, regarding the price of bank 
loans, for smaller firms that exhibit a poorer information environment and weaker internal 
                                                          
14
 This exercise is also useful for identification purposes. Providing estimations from models that exclude the 
firms that fall within the largest IRS defined size class means that we also exclude the very large corporations 
for which the IRS audit is almost certain (El Ghoul, Guedhami & Pittman, 2011). Such firms for example could 
be the very large corporations (asset value of higher than $5 billion) that belong to the Coordinated Industry 





corporate governance structures in comparison with larger corporations (Bhattacharya, Desai 
& Venkataraman, 2013; Ge, Koester & McVay, 2017).  
 
4.2 Robustness and Sensitivity Tests 
4.2.1 Controlling for Alternative Firm Size Measures 
The measure of IRS tax enforcement that we employ, i.e., the IRS audit rates by firm size 
group, hinges on firm size (total assets). In the baseline estimations, we have controlled for 
the size of firms by including in the models the natural logarithm of total assets. In this 
section, we further examine whether our baseline findings that support our main H1 
hypothesis are sensitive when we control for alternative measures of firm size (Bauer, Fang 
& Pittman, 2017). Hence, in models 1 and 2 of Table 7, we replace the natural logarithm of a 
firm’s total assets as a variable that captures size with the natural logarithm of total equity 
and sales respectively. In these models, both of these alternative size variables exert a 
negative and significant at 1% level effect on bank loan spreads consistent with our baseline 
estimates. More importantly, the estimations in Table 7 continue to lend support to our 
previous findings that US firms benefit from lower bank loan spreads when IRS tax 
enforcement is more stringent. The coefficients of Audit rate t are significant at the 1% level 
and negative (-0.0105, -0.00791) in models 1 and 2 of Table 7 respectively. These results are 
comparable to our baseline results both in terms of statistical and economic significance. 
Consequently, our estimations show that the negative relationship between Audit rate t and 
firms’ borrowing cost persists after controlling for alternative firm size measures. 
Table 7 
4.2.2 Alternative IRS Tax Enforcement Measures 
Our research focuses on the effect of the IRS Audit rate t , as of a proxy for IRS tax 
enforcement, on the cost of bank loans. Nevertheless, we complement this analysis with a 
series of alternative IRS tax enforcement proxies that capture further aspects of IRS tax 
enforcement. The first set of these alternative IRS tax enforcement measures reflects the 
yearly levels of IRS staffing (normalised by the annual corporate tax returns). Since these 
alternative IRS tax enforcement measures do not hinge on firm size, as the IRS audit rates do, 
they could supply further empirical evidence with regards to the effect of IRS tax 
enforcement on the cost of bank loans. The estimations that investigate the impact of the IRS 
staffing variables on the cost of bank loans are available in models 1-3 in Panel A of Table 8. 
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Note that in these estimations we do not include time effects. This is because time effects 
would exhibit perfect collinearity with the IRS staffing measures that display only yearly 
variation. In Panel A of Table 8, the coefficients of IRS employees (model 1), IRS revenue 
agents (model 2) and IRS criminal investigators (model 3) enter the regressions with a 
negative sign and are significant at the 1% level. These findings suggest that tax enforcement 
gauged by the IRS staffing levels decreases the cost of bank loans. Therefore, they are 
consistent with our main H1 hypothesis that banks value IRS tax enforcement when they 
price loans to borrower firms. Additionally, these findings align with the government 
acknowledgment that staffing levels play a crucial role in strengthening tax enforcement 
(Weisman, 2004; Rapperort, 2017).  
Table 8 
The second set of alternative IRS tax enforcement variables comprises the normalised 
number of IRS criminal referrals, IRS criminal prosecutions and civil penalties imposed by 
the IRS for tax fraud and negligence against firms. The estimations that employ this second 
set of alternative IRS tax enforcement variables are available in models 4-7 in Panel A of 
Table 8. We find a negative relationship between IRS civil penalties enacted against 
corporations and the spreads of bank loans. The coefficients of IRS fraud penalties and IRS 
negligence penalties are negative and significant at the 1% level in models 4 and 5 in Panel A 
of Table 8 respectively. These results show that IRS tax enforcement in the form of civil 
penalty proxies decreases firms’ borrowing cost supporting our earlier evidence.  In models 6 
and 7 in Panel A of Table 8, we also observe that the IRS criminal referrals and the IRS 
criminal prosecutions variables exert a negative and significant at the 1% level effect on the 
cost of bank loans. All in all, the findings in Panel A of Table 8 provide additional empirical 
support to the critical role of tax enforcement in reducing the cost of bank loans. 
One weakness of the estimations in Panel A of Table 8 is that we do not include time effects. 
As discussed, this is due to the fact these alternative measures of IRS tax enforcement exhibit 
only yearly variation. However, not including time effect might bias these estimates. 
Therefore, we proceed with a cross-sectional identification strategy that permits the presence 
of year effects in the models that employ these alternative IRS tax enforcement proxies. The 
extant literature supports that previous lending experience of a bank with a borrower reduces 
information asymmetries (Ioannidou & Ongena, 2010; Schenone, 2010; Prilmeier, 2017). 
Hence, we posit that banks would perceive IRS tax enforcement especially important as an 
external monitoring and corporate governance mechanism with regards to the pricing of loans 
to firms for which they do not exhibit a previous relationship, i.e., “relationship lending”. To 
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this end, we create a non-lending relationship dummy (NLR) that takes the value of 1 in the 
case that a lead bank
15
 of a syndicate has not provided a loan to the same firm over the 
previous five years prior to the current loan and zero otherwise
16
. As a next step, we employ 
models that include the non-relationship lending dummy (NLR) and its interactions with the 
alternative IRS tax enforcement measures. In these models, we include time effects and we 
drop the alternative IRS tax enforcement measures because they cannot be identified. 
However, the interactions of the alternative IRS tax enforcement variables and the non-
relationship lending dummy (NLR) can be identified in the presence of time effects. We 
present the estimations of these models in Panel B of Table 8. In these models, the 
coefficients of the interactions between the alternative IRS tax enforcement measures and the 
NLR dummy t  are negative and exhibit at the 5% level of significance except for the 
interactions of IRS Fraud penalties t * NLR-dummy t and IRS Negligence penalties t* NLR-
dummy t. These findings suggest that IRS tax enforcement is especially vital for lowering the 
bank loans spreads when the information asymmetry between banks and borrowers is at 
higher levels (i.e., in the absence of a previous lending relationship).  
4.2.3 Endogenous IRS Audit Rate 
An assumption of the baseline OLS models in Table 5 is that the audit rate variable is 
exogenous to the cost of bank loans measure, which is the dependent variable. Hoopes, 
Mescall & Pittman (2012) and Bauer, Fang & Pittman (2017) outline two reasons why this is 
plausible. The first reason is that firm managers could exert limited influence on the audit 
probability rates since the latter depends on firm size class, time and their interaction 
(Guedhami & Pittman, 2008; El Ghoul, Guedhami & Pittman, 2011).  This implies that the 
potential of a feedback effect, i.e., reverse causality, between the IRS audit rate and the cost 
of loans is constrained. Such a feedback effect would require a single firm to be able to 
influence the auditing decisions of the IRS with regards to the entire business population in 
each firm size class (Hoopes, Mescall & Pittman, 2012). The second reason is that the 
intensity of IRS tax enforcement is dependent on the governmental political ideology, which 
could be exogenous to firm outcomes such as the cost of the bank loans. Bagchi (2016) for 
                                                          
15 In syndicated lending, the lead bank is the intermediary between the corporation that obtains the loan and the 
other participant lenders. The lead bank is the institution responsible to monitor the borrower (Ivashina, 2009; 
Prilmeier, 2017). 
16 Based on the study of Prilmeier (2017) we assume that a borrowing relation ends if a firm and a lead bank 
have not had a contact for a loan in the last five years because the maximum maturity of the loans in our sample 




example show that audit rates of the IRS are significantly higher when the Democrats hold 
the executive branch of the US government.  
Nevertheless, Hoopes, Mescall & Pittman (2012) and Bauer, Fang & Pittman (2017) posit 
that one cannot exclude with certainty such reverse causality issue. For example, firm 
managers could engage in firm strategies, such as divestments or acquisitions, which could 
affect the firm size and therefore the audit probability that their firms could face
17
. 
Furthermore, some firms might have powerful political influence and could affect, at least in 
theory, the IRS audit rates. To ease these concerns, we relax the exogeneity assumption 
between the IRS audit rate and the cost of bank loans and proceed with a two-stage 
instrumental variable estimation. As a first step, we obtain predicted values of Audit rate t by 
employing an OLS model that comprises two instruments and the control variables that we 
employ in our baseline analysis. As a second step, we replace in our baseline model the IRS 
audit rate variable with its predicted values that we obtain from the first stage.  For the first 
instrument, we follow Guedhami & Pittman (2008) and employ lagged values of the IRS 
audit rates due to their explanatory power on Audit rate t . A firm’s probability of facing an 
IRS audit this year could depend on the likelihood of an audit by the IRS in the previous 
years. More specifically, we opt for the four-year lagged values of the IRS audit rates as our 
first instrument because they satisfy the exclusion restriction
18
 while they exert a strong 
explanatory power on the contemporaneous IRS audit rates.  Furthermore, another reason for 
opting for the fourth lag of the audit rate variable is that the statute of limitations is applicable 
only for three years after a corporation has filed its tax return (El Ghoul, Guedhami & 
Pittman, 2011). For the second instrument of the IRS audit rates we follow Hoopes, Mescall 
& Pittman (2012) and use the natural logarithm of the number of corporate tax returns in each 
asset size class filed in the previous year. The IRS audit rates are defined as the number of 
actual corporate returns that the IRS audits in each firm size class in a specific year divided 
by the number tax returns filed by corporations in each size class in the previous year. 
Consequently, audit rates depend on fluctuations of tax returns filed across time in the same 
firm size group
19
. The numerator component (i.e., the number of corporate tax returns that the 
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 We posit that this is not an issue of concern for this study because the number of observations of firms that 
change firm size class over the period of the study is limited. Moreover, in another robustness test that we 
present later in this study we find that our results hold when we exclude these observations.  
18
We run our baseline regression to observe the relationship between four-year lagged values of IRS audit rates 
and the cost of bank loans. We observe that there is no significant association between theses variables 
supporting in that way the suitability (in terms of satisfying the exclusion restriction) of the four-year lagged 
values of IRS audit rates as an instrument. These results are available upon request.  
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Similarly with our first instrument, the four-year lagged values of the IRS audit rate, also in this case we run 
our baseline regression model including our second instrument; the natural logarithm of the one-year lagged 
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IRS audits) is contemporaneous with the dependent variable that captures the cost of bank 
loans and therefore more vulnerable to a feedback effect. The denominator component (i.e., 
the number of tax returns that were filed by corporations in the previous year), which we use 
as the second instrument, reflects a lagged value concerning the cost of bank loans and is, 
therefore, less susceptible to reverse causality issues.  Furthermore, corporations are required 
to file their tax returns. This implies that it is not likely that a firm will try to influence its 
audit probability rate by not filing a tax return. 
The findings from the two-stage instrumental variable estimation are available in model 1 of 
Table 9. The first stage results show that the two instrumental variables (the four-year lagged 
values of the IRS audit rate and the natural logarithm of the lagged number of corporate tax 
returns) exert a significant at the 1% level effect on the IRS audit rates and exhibit the right 
coefficient signs (see lower part of model 1 in Table 8). Furthermore, in model 1 of Table 8, 
the validity of the instruments is supported by the under-identification LM test (UIT), the 
weak identification Wald F-Test (WIT)
20
 and the Hansen over-identification test (OIT). The 
second stage findings (see the upper part of model 1 in Table 8) show that the predicted 
values of the IRS audit rate that we obtain from the first stage exert a negative and signficiant 
at the 1% level effect on the cost of bank loans. We achieve similar results in models 2 and 3 
of Table 9 when we perform two-stage instrumental estimations using only one of the two 
instrument in each model
21
. Thus, the findings from the two-stage instrumental variable 
estimation in models 1 to 3 of Table 9 provide further support to our main H1 hypothesis that 




4.2.4 Other Robustness and Sensitivity Tests 
The estimations so far show that US public firms incur lower bank loan spreads under a 
higher level of IRS tax enforcement. This section includes some additional tests to provide 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
values of tax returns by firm size class. We do not find a statistically significant association between this second 
instrument and the cost of bank loans. This finding supports the suitability (in terms of satisfying the exclusion 
restriction) of the natural logarithm of the one-year lagged values of filed tax returns by size class as an 
instrument of the IRS audit rates. Furthermore, this result conforms to the findings of Hoopes, Mescall & 
Pittman (2012) who show that most of the variation of the audit rate variable comes from its numerator (i.e. the 
corporate tax returns audited by the IRS) rather than from its denominator (the number of corporate tax return 
filed in the previous year). The results from this estimation are available upon request.  
20
 We use the critical values for the weak identification test (WIT) as developed by Stock & Yogo (2005). 
21
 Note that the use of one instrument in models 2 and 3 of Table 8 means that we are not able to conduct over-
identification tests. 
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 Authors of studies that have used instrumental variable analysis with regards to the IRS audit rate advise that 
we should be cautious and interpret findings from such analysis just as corroborating evidence to the baseline 
analysis (Guedhami & Pittman, 2008; Hoopes, Mescall & Pittman, 2012). This is because of the difficulty of 
identifying 100% suitable instruments for the IRS audit rate.  
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further empirical proof in support of this finding.  Our sample includes firms that obtain more 
than one loan facility in the same year. This could introduce a spurious correlation issue in 
our estimations. In the baseline estimations, we have tried to address this issue with firm-
level clustering. Here we further examine whether our findings hold when we keep only the 
observations with the largest loan-year facilities for firms that have obtained more than one 
loan facility in a given year (Francis, Hasan & Wu, 2013; Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 2014). 
In the first model of Table 10, the coefficient on Audit rate t is negative and significant at the 
1% level (-0.0137), lending support to our baseline findings. The previous exercise allows us 
also to exploit the panel nature of our dataset since we do not have repeated firm observations 
in a given year. Therefore, we proceed in performing firm fixed-effect regressions to control 
for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We present the findings of this estimation in model 2 of 
Table 10. The Audit rate t variable enters the regression negatively and is significant at the 
1% level (-0.0197) corroborating our previous results. Even though the Hausman test fails to 
accept the null hypothesis for random effects, we also tabulate in model 3 of Table 10 the 
findings from the random-effects estimation to show the consistency of our results. 
Additionally, in model 4 of Table 10, we re-estimate our regression using lead-bank fixed 
effects as in Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang (2014). We show that Audit rate t is negative and 
significant at the 1% level as in our baseline regressions. Lastly, in model 5 of Table 10, we 
control for potential bias stemming from potential inflation effects reflected into firms falling 
into higher IRS defined firm size classes over the period of the study. To this end, we drop 
from our sample observations of firms that have moved to a different IRS firm size class 
during the period of our study following Hoopes, Mescall & Pittman (2012). Our results 
show that Audit rate t continues to exert a negative and significant at the 1% level effect on 
bank loan spreads in support of our previous findings.  
Table 10 
 
4.2.5 Evidence from Section 404b of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act 2002 
Recent empirical evidence from Bozanic, Hoopes, Thornock & Williams (2017) shows that 
regulations that increase public corporate disclosure facilitate IRS tax enforcement. The 
authors find that the IRS acquires information from the public financial disclosures of 
corporations to supplement and corroborate the private information, such as the corporate tax 
returns, it already possesses on these firms.  
A regulation that its introduction has significantly increased the public disclosure of financial 
information on corporations, and therefore could facilitate the monitoring function of the IRS, 
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is the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. The SOX Act that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) administers was enacted in 2002 with the aim to enhance the financial 
reporting quality of public US firms. Specifically, the Section 404b of the SOX Act requires 
firms to obtain an independent auditor attestation on the management evaluation of the 
efficacy of the company’s internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). These auditor 
attestations on the ICFRs could be favourable or adverse. Adverse auditor attestations denote 
the presence of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) regarding financial reporting. A report 
from Audit Analytics in 2016 shows that each year at least 4% of the independent auditor 
attestations on the ICFRs of public corporations are adverse (Audit Analytics, 2016). 
Furthermore, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) places a strong 
emphasis on auditors obtaining sufficient evidence to support their attestations (PCAOB, 
2015).   
In the light of the findings of Bozanic, Hoopes, Thornock & Williams (2017), it is plausible 
that the increased public financial reporting via the Section 404b of the SOX Act could 
facilitate IRS tax enforcement. The information available through the Section 404b of the 
SOX Act, such as the presence of ICWs in a firm, could be useful to the IRS. Firms with 
ICWs exhibit a lower quality of financial reporting (Doyle, Ge & McVay, 2007; Ashbaugh-
Skaife, Collins, Kinney Jr. & LaFond, 2008) and this could also relate to taxation 
information. Furthermore, many ICWs under the Section 404b of the SOX act refer to the tax 
function of a corporation (Bauer, 2016). Gleason, Pincus & Rego (2017) find that in 
corporations with tax-related ICWs the implementation of aggressive financial reporting 
practices becomes easier. This could be of interest to the IRS since such methods is a 
common characteristic of tax shelter corporations (Wilson, 2009; Lisowsky, 2010).  All in all, 
the information available through the Section 404b of the SOX Act is likely to facilitate IRS 
tax enforcement and therefore enhance its importance as an external corporate governance 
mechanism that lowers information asymmetries and tax uncertainties. This could lead to 
lower bank loan spreads for the firms that have to comply with the Section 404b of the SOX 
Act.  
Yet, the Section 404b of the SOX Act does not affect all firms as it provides an exemption to 
non-accelerated fillers, which are the firms that have a smaller than $75 million public float 
value. The reason being that these firms face relatively higher burdens regarding compliance 
costs.  As a result, the introduction of the Section 404b of the SOX Act offers a quasi-
experiment to explore any change in bank loan spreads between two groups of firms; treated 
and control firms. The logic there is that the introduction of the Section 404b of the SOX Act 
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facilitates IRS tax enforcement for the firms for which it applies to (i.e., treated firms) due to 
reasons not stemming from the cost of bank loans of these firms. Treated firms are the ones 
classified as accelerated fillers, i.e., typically the firms that their market capitalization is more 
than $75 million, following the SOX Act in 2002. Control firms are those that remain 
unaffected by the Section 404b of the SOX Act and are known as non-accelerated filler. We 
source annual data observations from Audit Analytics to identify which firms fall within the 
treated group (accelerated filler firms) and which in the control group (non-accelerated filler 
group). All things being equal, if the information available in the Section 404b of the SOX 
Act facilitates IRS tax enforcement, then one may expect that treated firms would enjoy 
lower borrowing costs regarding bank loan spreads after its implementation compared with 
the control firms. 
We examine this prediction employing a sample covering two periods; one period before the 
enactment of the Section 404b of the SOX Act in 2002 (1990-2001) and one period after its 
adoption (2003-2016). As a first step, we use propensity score matching as a technique to 
identify one control firm for each treated. Treated firm stands for a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 for an accelerated filler firm for the post-adoption period and 0 otherwise. Further, 
we employ this treated firm dummy variable as a dependent variable in a logistic regression 
to estimate the likelihood that a firm complies with the Section 404b of the SOX Act for the 
2003-2016 periods.
23
 Next, we employ the propensity score estimated from the logistic 
regression to match each one of treated firms, which takes the value of 1, with one control 
firm (non-accelerated filler firms for the 2003-2016 period) with the closest propensity score 
that takes the value of 0. Then we obtain the matching loan-year facilities for these pairs. We 
need to have pairs in both periods prior and post the adoption of the Section 404b of the SOX 
Act to perform a difference-in-difference estimation. This method diminishes our sample to 
105 loan-facilities initiated before the implementation of Section 404b and 180 after the 
implementation of Section 404b. We use the Post-404b loan dummy variable for loans 
originated between the 2003-2016 period and 0 otherwise. Lastly, we use the interaction 
variable Post-404b loan* Treated firm to gauge the difference-in-difference estimate in bank 
loan spreads among treated and control companies for the two different periods following the 
Section 404b of the SOX Act in 2002. Model 1 of Table 11 reports our finding. We find that 
the coefficient of the Post-404b loan* Treated firm interaction term is negative (-0.354) and 
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The likelihood for a firm to comply with the 404b SOX section depends solely on its level of public float. As a 
result, the independent variable that we use to predict the likelihood of being in that group is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization.   
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significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that accelerated fillers firms that comply with 
the Section 404b of the SOX Act have significantly lower interest spreads for the loans 
obtained after its implementation compared with control firms that are non-accelerated fillers 
and were not affected by the Section 404b of the SOX Act.
24
 
These results are in line with the notion that the information available through the 
implementation of the Section 404b of the SOX Act could facilitate IRS tax enforcement. 
This could lower information asymmetries between banks and the treated firms (i.e., the firms 
that have to comply with the Section 404b of the SOX Act) resulting into lower bank loan 
spreads for the latter group of firms in the period after the implementation of this legislation.  
Table 11 
4.2.6 IRS Tax Enforcement and Loan Covenants 
Besides setting the price of a loan, banks could also set covenant requirements in loan 
contracts to reduce the risk associated with granting credit (Graham, Li & Qiu, 2008; 
Bharath, Dahiya & Saunders, 2009; Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang, 2014).  We use logistic 
regression to observe the relationship between Audit rate t and a dichotomous variable that 
takes the value of 1 if a loan facility has covenant requirements and 0 otherwise. We present 
these findings in model 1 of Table 12. We observe that the coefficient -0.0504 of Audit rate t 
is negative and significant at the 1% level. These findings show that stringent IRS tax 
enforcement reduces the probability of the presence of a covenant in a loan contract. This 
provides further evidence to the notion that banks view tax enforcement as an external 
mechanism of corporate governance that could mitigate information asymmetries between 
them and corporate borrowers. Thus, stringent IRS tax enforcement decreases banks’ 
incentive to set covenants when they provide credit to firms. We provide further support to 
this finding in model 2 of Table 12 when we re-estimate model 1 with an OLS regression.  
We also report similar results in model 3 of Table 12 when we perform two-stage least 
squares instrumental variable estimation using the two instruments we employ in section 
4.2.3 (four-years lagged values of IRS audit rates and the natural log of the number of 
corporate tax returns filed the year before).  
Table 12  
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These estimations do not include some loan characteristics, as there are missing observations on loan maturity 




Previous empirical studies find that tax enforcement plays an informational role in the 
financial markets and decreases the cost of bonds and the cost of equity for corporations. In 
this paper, we shed light on the relationship between tax enforcement and the cost of banks 
loans in the US syndicated loan market.  We find that tax enforcement, as measured by the 
IRS audit rates, reduces the bank loan spreads for US corporations. This result holds in a 
series of robustness checks that comprise the use of alternative IRS tax enforcement 
measures, instrumental variable estimations to account for endogeneity issues, panel data 
estimations, and a quasi-experiment framework based on the Section 404b of the Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) Act.  We also find that the negative effect of IRS tax enforcement on bank loan 
spreads strengthens for smaller corporations. Furthermore, we provide evidence that stringent 
IRS tax enforcement reduces the probability that a loan will contain covenants.   
All in all, these results suggest that banks value the role of tax enforcement as an external 
mechanism of corporate governance that could reduce information asymmetries between 
them and corporate borrowers. The findings of this study are useful from a theoretical 
standpoint because they provide evidence that tax enforcement plays a valuable informational 
role even for banks, who in comparison with other types of debt-holders, such as the owners 
of corporate bonds, are better positioned and more likely to monitor corporate borrowers. 
From a public policy perspective, this study highlights the usefulness of the IRS to the US 
economy. Except for its main function as a tax collection agency, the IRS exerts a positive 
spillover to the US economy in the form of lower costs of corporate financing.  Therefore, 
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Table 1. Variable definition and measurements  
 Panel A. Dependent variable and main explanatory variables 
 Variables Definitions Source 
Audit rate t Probability of a firm to face an IRS audit in year t TRAC 
   
Firm characteristics     
Firm size t-1 The natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1 COMPUSTAT 
ROA t-1 Net operating income divided by total assets in year t-1 COMPUSTAT 
Liquidity t-1 Current assets divided by total assets in year t-1 COMPUSTAT 
Leverage t-1 Long-term debt divided by total assets in year t-1 COMPUSTAT 
Tangibility t-1 
Net property, plant and equity divided by total assets in 
year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
Cash effective tax rate t-1 Cash tax paid divided by pre-tax book income in year t-1 COMPUSTAT 
    
Loan characteristics     
Loan spread t (basis points) 
The “all-in-spread drawn” (AISD), which is the loan 
interest payment in basis points over the LIBOR plus the 
annual fee for a loan facility that a firm obtain in year t. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Loan size t ($ Millions) 




Loan maturity t (year) 
Number of years to maturity of a loan facility obtained 
by a firm in year t 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Loan purpose t 
Dummy variables for loan purposes including corporate 
purposes, debt repayment, working capital, takeover, 
back up loans, etc. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Loan type t 
Dummy variables for loan types  including term loan, 
revolver greater than one year, revolver less than 1 year 
and 364-day facility 
Thomson One 
Banker 
   Panel B. Variables used in sensitivity analysis specifications 
Alternative IRS proxies 
IRS employees t                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The number of IRS employees divided by corporate tax 
returns  in year t 
TRAC 
IRS revenue agents t 
The number of IRS revenue agents divided by corporate 
tax returns in year t 
TRAC 
IRS criminal investigators t  
The number of IRS criminal investigators divided by 
corporate tax returns  in year t 
TRAC 
IRS fraud penalties t 
Number of IRS fraud penalties divided by corporate tax 
returns  in year t 
TRAC 
IRS negligence penalties t 
Number of IRS negligence penalties divided by 
corporate tax returns  in year t 
TRAC 
IRS criminal referrals t 
The number of IRS criminal tax referrals divided by 
corporate tax returns  in year t 
TRAC 
IRS criminal prosecutions t 
The number of IRS criminal tax prosecutions divided by 
IRS criminal referrals  in year t 
TRAC 
    
Alternative size proxies     
Equity t-1 The natural logarithm of total equity in year t-1 COMPUSTAT 
Sales t-1 The natural logarithm of total sales in year t-1 COMPUSTAT 
    
Loan characteristics     
Covenant t 
Equals to one if a loan facility  obtained by a firm in 
year t has covenants and zero otherwise 
Thomson One 
Banker 
NRL dummy t 
Equals to one if a firm has been credited a loan in year t 
and has not obtained any other loan from the same lead 






















Table 2. IRS face-to-face audit rates of corporate income tax returns and sample distribution 
               Panel A of this table reports the probability of an IRS audit for firms according to time and size. Panel B outlines the sample distribution (9,971 observations) by time and asset classification. 
 
Panel A. IRS audit rates across time and size                                          
  
Asset class 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
  
>$250 Million 54.6 55.5 54.7 50.9 48.4 45.9 37.3 34.6 30.5 31.4 33.7 29 38.1 42.6 34.2 26.3 26.9 25 24.3 27 28.5 32.3 24.7 19.9 17.8 
  
$100-250 Million 31.3 32.3 30.6 27.8 26.8 22.5 19 18.5 16.9 17.1 15.5 12.2 15.9 16.7 13.7 11.5 12.6 13.3 14.4 16.4 22.5 18.8 12.4 13.4 10.4 
  
$50-100 Million 28.5 25.4 24.3 21.5 20.8 19.2 17.5 16 14.1 11.9 10.3 9.4 12.1 15.5 13.4 10.9 11.4 14 15.9 18.6 20.4 15 10.8 10.7 9.9 
  
$10-50 Million 23.2 23.3 22.2 19.6 19.7 20 17.7 14.7 11.4 9.3 7.5 5.9 8.8 11.4 14 14.7 11.6 9.9 13.2 13.1 10.1 6.6 5.9 5.3 4.4 
  
$5-10 Million 18.8 19.3 15.7 14.7 13.9 16 13.4 10.1 6.8 5.1 4.5 3.2 1.9 2.4 3.3 2.9 3 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.4 
  
$1-5 Million 9.9 9.6 7 6 6.6 7.7 6.4 4.9 2.9 2 2 1.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.9 2 1.3 1.1 1 0.9 
  
$0,25- 1 Million 4 4 2.4 2.1 2.7 3.5 2.5 1.7 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.1 1 
  Panel B. Sample Distribution                                                    
Asset class 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total % 
>$250 Million 93 134 47 291 579 501 606 592 651 420 389 435 394 340 356 235 134 236 369 267 341 289 328 308 63 8398 84.2% 
$100-250 
Million 
13 8 6 48 149 158 143 127 57 54 34 39 28 33 21 11 10 5 8 9 14 9 7 6 1 998 10.0% 




$10-50 Million  
2 3 27 50 56 27 21 8 3 3 4 
   
2 4 2 
   
3 
   
215 2.2% 
$5-10 Million 1  
3 2 4 4 4 
                  
18 0.2% 
$1-5 Million     
4 2 1 1 
            
1 
    
9 0.1% 
$0,25- 1 Million               
1 
          
1 0.0% 
Total 114 152 69 408 826 792 818 771 729 481 429 484 432 378 389 253 151 252 378 278 365 307 335 316 64 9971 100.0% 
% 1.1% 1.5% 0.7% 4.1% 8.3% 7.9% 8.2% 7.7% 7.3% 4.8% 4.3% 4.9% 4.3% 3.8% 3.9% 2.5% 1.5% 2.5% 3.8% 2.8% 3.7% 3.1% 3.4% 3.2% 0.6% 100.0%   
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the dependent and the main regression variables. 
  
 
      
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 
Audit rate t 30.541 9.581 24.7 30.5 37.3 
Firm characteristics 
     Firm size t-1 7.2648 1.7394 6.0647 7.2308 8.4713 
ROA t-1 0.0223 0.0342 0.0112 0.0216 0.0341 
Liquidity t-1 1.8826 2.1252 1.0734 1.5299 2.2312 
Leverage t-1 0.5317 0.2500 0.3794 0.5066 0.6472 
Tangibility t-1 0.6431 0.4354 0.3080 0.5763 0.9188 
Cash effective rate t-1 0.2817 1.8268 0.2346 0.3511 0.3926 
Loan characteristics 
     Loan spread t (basis 
points) 200 151 98 175 275 
Loan size t ($ Millions) 433 889 75 197 450 
Loan maturity t (year) 4 2 3 5 5 
      
The table reports descriptive statistics for the 9,971 firm-year observations over the 1992-2016 period used in our regression 




































Loan spread t 1                   
Audit rate t -0.363 1         
Firm size t-1 -0.362 0.219 1        
ROA t-1 -0.201 0.075 0.035 1       
Liquidity t-1 0.056 -0.076 -0.188 0.027 1      
Leverage t-1 0.23 0.053 -0.031 -0.07 -0.207 1     
Tangibility t-1 -0.056 0.022 0.141 -0.121 -0.223 0.028 1    
Cash effective 
rate t-1 
-0.012 -0.01 0.03 0.025 -0.005 -0.036 -0.019 1 
  
Loan maturity t 0.178 -0.039 -0.111 0.021 0.066 0.012 -0.056 -0.002 1  
Loan size t -0.325 0.187 0.696 0.074 -0.114 -0.017 0.084 0.045 0.029 1 
This table reports Pearson correlations coefficients for the main variables used in our regressions. Boldface denotes 1% statistical 
significance. Table 1 includes full details on the definitions and calculation for all variables. 

























Table 5. The effect of IRS audit rate on bank loan spreads 
     
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Audit rate t -0.00709*** -0.00796***   
 (0.00152) (0.00171)   
Extr_Audit rate t   -0.0140***  
   (0.00156)  
Audit rate t-1    -0.00853*** 
(0.00211) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.228*** -0.162*** -0.150*** -0.159*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0179) (0.0175) (0.0178) 
ROA t-1 -3.072*** -3.922*** -3.844*** -3.842*** 
 (0.583) (0.810) (0.796) (0.781) 
Liquidity t-1 0.0197*** 0.0108 0.0130 0.0104 
 (0.00713) (0.00722) (0.00810) (0.00684) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.188*** -0.156*** -0.146*** -0.157*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0447) (0.0438) (0.0432) 
Leverage t-1 0.772*** 0.744*** 0.755*** 0.726*** 
 (0.0976) (0.120) (0.118) (0.113) 
Cash effect. rate t-1 0.00277 0.00382 0.00405 0.00173 
 (0.00257) (0.00266) (0.00252) (0.00337) 
Loan size t  -0.0821*** -0.0777*** -0.0819*** 
  (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0143) 
Loan maturity t  0.143*** 0.140*** 0.146*** 
  (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0224) 
Constant 6.852*** 6.742*** 6.607*** 6.766*** 
 (0.159) (0.173) (0.166) (0.170) 
     
Observations 9,971 7,054 7,286 7,146 
R-squared 0.498 0.512 0.499 0.512 
Loan type & purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents results from regressing bank loan spreads on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
audit rates after controlling for firm (all Models) and loan-level characteristics (Model 2, 3 & 4). 
Table 1 includes full details on the definitions and calculation for all variables. Regressions are 
based on OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses and within firm clustering. 









Table 6.  The effect of IRS audit rate on the bank loan spreads of firms with less than $250 
million of assets 
     
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Audit rate t -0.0488*** -0.0385*** -0.0720* -0.228*** 
 (0.00521) (0.00958) (0.0430) (0.0826) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.257*** -0.102 0.0880 0.232 
 (0.0826) (0.108) (0.126) (0.263) 
ROA t-1 -1.984** -1.045 -0.242 2.620 
 (0.967) (1.421) (0.741) (2.278) 
Liquidity t-1 0.0124 0.00649 -0.0300 0.168 
 (0.00880) (0.00742) (0.0306) (0.135) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.0809 -0.104* 0.791** 0.621 
 (0.0524) (0.0616) (0.397) (0.804) 
Leverage t-1 0.424*** 0.626*** -0.111 1.623 
 (0.102) (0.151) (0.121) (1.307) 
Cash effective rate t-1 -0.00221 -0.000518 -0.0737** 1.234 
 (0.00627) (0.00518) (0.0367) (0.771) 
Loan size t  -0.113***  -0.00304 
  (0.0297)  (0.0244) 
Loan maturity t  0.0579  0.0152 
  (0.0565)  (0.0182) 
Constant 7.653*** 7.439*** 5.923*** 6.869*** 
 (0.488) (0.638) (0.805) (1.212) 
     
Observations 974 486 571 221 
R-squared 0.359 0.409 0.965 0.980 
Loan type & purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents results from regressing bank loan spreads on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit 
rates after controlling for firm (all Models) and loan-level characteristics (Model 2 & 4). Models 1 & 
2 include loan-year facilities for firms of asset size between $100 and 250Millions, while Models 3 & 
4 of asset size between $100-0.25Million. In models 1 and 3 we exclude loan size and loan maturity 
to allow running our regressions with more observations. Table 1 includes full details on the 
definitions and calculation for all variables. Regressions are based on OLS regressions with robust 
standard errors in parentheses and within firm clustering. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% 


























This table presents results from regressing bank loan spreads on IRS audit rate 
and alternative size measures after controlling for firm and loan-level 
characteristics. Model 1 includes the natural logarithm of total equity and 
Model 2 the natural logarithm of total sales. Regressions are based on OLS 
regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses and within firm 
clustering. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level is represented by *, 
**, and *** respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
   
Audit rate t -0.0105*** -0.00791*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00277) 
Equity t-1  -0.175***  
 (0.0156)  
Sales t-1  -0.146*** 
  (0.0137) 
ROA t-1 -4.017*** -3.215*** 
 (0.693) (0.701) 
Liquidity t-1 0.0424*** 0.00549 
 (0.0142) (0.00791) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.184*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0444) 
Leverage t-1 0.643*** 0.764*** 
 (0.118) (0.124) 
Cash effective rate t-1 0.00975*** 0.00191 
 (0.00370) (0.00269) 
Loan size t -0.0658*** -0.0993*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0130) 
Loan maturity t 0.152*** 0.144*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0227) 
Constant 6.526*** 6.713*** 
 (0.182) (0.160) 
   
Observations 6,630 6,871 
R-squared 0.538 0.507 
Loan type & purpose Yes  Yes 
Year FE             Yes  Yes 






Table 8.  The effect of alternative measures of IRS tax enforcement on bank loan spreads 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results from regressing bank loan spreads on alternative IRS tax 
enforcement measures after controlling for firm and loan-level characteristics except for year effects. 
Panel B shows findings from regressing bank loan spreads on the interaction between the alternative 
IRS tax enforcement measures and the NLR-dummy t which that stands for a non-lending relationship 
dummy variable. This dummy takes the value of 1 when a firm has not obtained a loan by the same 
lead bank in the last 5 years before a loan facility initiation and 0 otherwise. Table 1 includes full 
details on the definitions and calculation for all variables. Regressions are based on OLS regressions 
with robust standard errors in parentheses and within firm clustering. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and the 1% level is represented by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Panel A.  Regressions of bank loan spreads 
on alternative IRS tax enforcement proxies 
and controls. 
       
        
IRS Employees t -0.0529***       
 (0.009)       
IRS Revenue agents t  -0.494***      
  (0.088)      
IRS Criminal investigators t   -1.894***     
   (0.329)     
IRS Fraud penalties t    -20.98***    
    (3.776)    
IRS Negligence penalties t     -5.403***   
     (1.424)   
IRS Criminal referrals t      -2.399***  
      (0.457)  
IRS Criminal prosecutions t       -1.227*** 
 
 
                                          
      (0.291) 
All control variables except year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312 
R-squared 0.469 0.474 0.470 0.496 0.480 0.484 0.486 
Loan type & purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Panel B. Alternative IRS proxies cross 
sectional  identification strategy          
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
NLR-dummy t 0.0769 0.0731 0.0747 0.0426 0.0162 0.0747 0.00909 
 (0.0777) (0.0770) (0.0775) (0.0747) (0.0710) (0.0775) (0.0705) 
        
IRS Employees t * NLR-dummy t -0.0022**       
 (0.001)       
IRS Revenue agents t* NLR-dummy t  -0.016**      
  (0.007)      
IRS Criminal investigators t* NLR-dummy t   -0.079**     
   (0.039)     
IRS Fraud penalties t * NLR-dummy t    -0.395    
    (0.246)    
IRS Negligence penalties t* NLR-dummy t     -0.129   
     (0.087)   
IRS Criminal referrals t * NLR-dummy t      -0.071**  
      (0.034)  
IRS Criminal prosecutions t* NLR-dummy t       -0.521*** 
       (0.101) 
        
All control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312 
R-squared 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.536 0.537 0.536 
Loan type & purpose   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 9.  The effect of endogenous IRS audit rate on bank loan spreads 
 IV I IV II IV III  
Variables Estimation Estimation Estimation 
Second stage    
    
Predicted Audit rate t -0.00990*** -0.0141*** -0.00896*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00354) (0.00212) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.153*** -0.146*** -0.154*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0149) (0.0108) 
ROA t-1 -3.754*** -3.850*** -3.762*** 
 (0.584) (0.602) (0.581) 
Liquidity t-1 0.00915** 0.00948** 0.00912** 
 (0.00440) (0.00442) (0.00440) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.161*** -0.155*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0248) (0.0243) 
Leverage t-1 0.796*** 0.785*** 0.795*** 
 (0.120) (0.116) (0.120) 
Cash effective rate t-1 0.00260 0.00267 0.00264 
 (0.00234) (0.00236) (0.00234) 
Loan size t -0.0871*** -0.0883*** -0.0873*** 
 (0.0104) (0.00973) (0.0105) 
Loan maturity t 0.124*** 0.118*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0156) 
Constant 6.590*** 6.641*** 6.574*** 
 (0.108) (0.130) (0.107) 
    
First stage     






Audit rate t-4 0.557***                                           - 0.665*** 
 (0.014)  (0.009) 
Observations 6,823 6,977 6,823 
R-squared 0.492 0.496 0.492 
LM test p-value (UIT) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald F-Test (WIT) 
with critical value 
   3352.85 
19.93 




Hansen J p-value (OIT) 0.3093 - - 
Loan type & purpose Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents results from regressing bank loan spreads on IRS audit rates after controlling for firm and loan-level 
characteristics. Model IV I estimation shows the results from a two-stage instrumental regression procedure where we use 
two instruments; i) four-year lagged values of IRS audit rates  and ii) natural logarithm of the number of corporate tax 
returns filed in the previous year. Model IV II & III shows estimations from a two-stage instrumental procedure where we 
use as the instrumental variable the natural logarithm of the number of corporate tax returns filed in the previous year and the 
four-year lagged values of IRS audit rates respectively. UIT is the under-identification LM test by Kleibergen and Paap, 
WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the weak identification test, which must be higher than its critical value to reject the null. OIT 
is the over-identification test of Hansen. Table 1 includes full details on the definitions and calculation for all variables. 






Table 10. Other robustness and sensitivity analysis 
This table presents results from regressing bank loan spreads on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit rates after 
controlling for firm and loan characteristics. Model 1 re-estimates the cross-sectional regression of IRS audit rates 
on bank loan spreads keeping only the largest loan-facility per year (for the firms that have taken more than one 
loan facility in a given year). Regression is based on OLS estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses 
and within firm clustering. Models 2 & 3 make use of the panel nature of our dataset and tabulate fixed and 
random firm effects regressions with robust standard errors respectively. Model 4 re-estimates the cross-sectional 
regression of IRS audit rates on bank loan spreads after controlling for lead-bank fixed effects. Model 5 re-
estimates the cross-sectional regression of IRS audit rates on bank loan spreads excluding observations from firms 
that have changed an IRS defined size class over the period under study. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% 








 Cross-sectional Fixed-effects Random-effects Lead bank Inflation accounted 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Audit rate t -0.0137*** -0.0197*** -0.0187*** -0.00867*** -0.0134*** 
 (0.00179) (0.00204) (0.00154) (0.00179) (0.00209) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.141*** -0.0172 -0.109*** -0.160*** -0.165*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0286) (0.0162) (0.0120) (0.0174) 
ROA t-1 -3.518*** -2.405*** -2.492*** -3.825*** -4.798*** 
 (0.757) (0.565) (0.478) (0.663) (0.899) 
Liquidity t-1 0.00997 -0.000658 0.00282 0.0102* 0.0109 
 (0.00880) (0.00625) (0.00607) (0.00614) (0.00789) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.116*** -0.142** -0.161*** -0.152*** -0.145*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0596) (0.0420) (0.0315) (0.0493) 
Leverage t-1 0.708*** 0.462*** 0.541*** 0.732*** 0.852*** 
 (0.159) (0.0888) (0.126) (0.113) (0.0791) 
Cash eff. rate t-1 0.00207 0.00119 0.000688 0.00162 0.000316 
 (0.00406) (0.00390) (0.00394) (0.00321) (0.00357) 
Loan size t -0.106*** -0.0280** -0.0589*** -0.0827*** -0.0759*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0125) 
Loan maturity t 0.160*** 0.0707*** 0.0961*** 0.146*** 0.148*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0180) (0.0182) (0.0178) (0.0234) 
Constant 6.767*** 6.004*** 6.639*** 6.750*** 6.824*** 
 (0.182) (0.266) (0.184) (0.139) (0.187) 
      
Observations 4,703 4,703 4,703 7,086 6,194 
R-squared 0.523 0.422 0.562 0.513 0.529 
Loan type & purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes 






Table 11. Evidence from a quasi-experiment. Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
   
Variables Model (1) Model (2) 
   
Treated firm  -0.0113  
 (0.296)  
Post-404b loan 0.951***  
 (0.165)  
Post-404b loan* Treated firm -0.354**  
 (0.158)  
Firm Size t-1 -0.712*** -0.684*** 
 (0.0556) (0.0547) 
ROA t-1 -12.49*** -13.97*** 
 (1.239) (1.057) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.0176 -0.0470 
 (0.0319) (0.0297) 
Tangibility t-1 -1.914*** -1.611*** 
 (0.175) (0.111) 
Leverage t-1 1.481*** 1.538*** 
 (0.185) (0.184) 
Cash effective rate t-1 0.159 0.0959 
 (0.151) (0.149) 
Constant 10.15*** 9.518*** 
 (0.630) (0.491) 
   
Observations 285 285 
Loan type dummy Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes 
Model 1 of this table presents the results of the difference-in-difference 
estimation using a sample of treated firms (firms that comply with the 404b 
Section of the SOX act and take the value 1) and their matched pairs (firms that 
are exempted from the 404b Section of the SOX act  and take the value of 0). 
We use propensity score matching technique to identify the matched pairs of 
our sample. Our final sample includes 105 loan-facilities initiated before the 
404b and 180 after the 404b. Post-404b loan dummy variable stands for loans 
originated between 2003 and 2016 and 0 otherwise. Lastly, the interaction 
variable Post-404b loan* Treated firm gauges the difference-in-difference 
estimate in loan spreads between treated and control firms for the two periods 
following the 404b SOX in 2002. Model 2 presents OLS regression results of 
the sample with robust standard errors and within-firm clustering including 










Table 12. IRS audit rate and the presence of loan covenants 
 Logistic model OLS  IV  
VARIABLES Estimation Estimation Estimation 
    
Audit rate t -0.0504*** -0.00520***  
 (0.0129) (0.00120)  
Predicted Audit rate t   -0.00381*** 
   (0.00122) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.0505 -0.0196** -0.0191*** 
 (0.0739) (0.00872) (0.00515) 
ROA t-1 0.711 0.0473 0.0136 
 (1.733) (0.247) (0.171) 
Liquidity t-1 0.0231 0.00272 0.00439* 
 (0.0268) (0.00425) (0.00235) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.369** -0.0583*** -0.0538*** 
 (0.151) (0.0222) (0.0144) 
Leverage t-1 -0.00871 -0.0203 0.00151 
 (0.209) (0.0307) (0.0217) 
Cash effective rate t-1 0.000762 6.84e-05 0.00101 
 (0.0210) (0.00229) (0.00163) 
Loan size t 0.0956 0.0189** 0.0169*** 
 (0.0788) (0.00909) (0.00542) 
Loan maturity t 0.371*** 0.0560*** 0.0587*** 
 (0.0735) (0.0115) (0.00807) 
Constant -2.580*** 0.562*** 0.0810* 
 (0.442) (0.126) (0.0423) 
    
First stage     
Corporate tax returns t-1   -3.384*** 
   (0.280) 
Audit rate t-4   0.518*** 
   (0.016) 
Observations 7,089 7,089 6,823 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2775 - - 
R-squared - 0.331 0.5207 
LM test p-value (UIT) - - 0.000 
Wald F-Test (WIT) 
with critical value 
- - 2862.197 
19.93 
Hansen J p-value (OIT) - - 0.1389 
Loan type & purpose  Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents results from regressing the loan covenant dummy (equals to one if a loan facility obtained by a firm in year t has 
covenants and 0 otherwise) on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit rates after controlling for firm and loan-level characteristics. 
Model 1 is estimated using logistic regression, while Model 2 is determined based on OLS. Model IV shows the results from a two-
stage instrumental variable regression procedure where we use two instruments; i) four-year lagged values of IRS audit rates and ii) 
natural logarithm of the number of corporate tax returns filed in the previous year. UIT is the under-identification LM test by 
Kleibergen and Paap, WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the weak identification test, which must be higher than its critical value to 
reject the null. OIT is the over-identification test of Hansen. Table 1 includes full details on the definitions and calculation for all 
variables. Regressions are based on OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses and within firm clustering. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level is represented by *, **, and *** respectively.  
